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Abstract. This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain 
tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the hu-
man person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic 
sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous 
system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not 
be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on 
the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that noetic operations directly interact 
with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic–psychosomatic 
interactions that expands upon the first part’s rapprochement between the new mech-
anist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue 
that noetic–psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way 
diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordi-
nating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James 
Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite 
pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, co-
ordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with 
a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology 
understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the 
nervous system.
The Interaction of Noetic and Psychosomatic Operations...
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Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
DV Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
In DA  Sentencia libri De anima
In I Cor Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura 
QDdA Quaestiones disputatae de anima
QDSC Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis
SCG Summa contra gentiles
ST  Summa theologiae
This article, the second of a two-part essay on Thomist philosophical 
anthropology and neuroscience, takes as its point of departure the account 
of hylomorphic animalism (HMA) and new mechanistic philosophy (NMP) 
of neuroscience and psychology presented in the previous article. In the 
present article, I articulate a speculative framework for understanding how 
immaterial intellectual operations can interact with other psychological 
operations that are embodied in the nervous system. Said otherwise, this 
article aims to develop a contemporary version of Aquinas’s claim that the 
human intellect—an entirely immaterial power—is able to engage with the 
phantasms produced by the embodied powers of the internal senses.
Let us commence with a cursory summation of the three sections of the 
previous article (De Haan 2017b). In the first section, I presented an account 
of HMA that I distinguished from the more contentious claims of a Thomist 
hylomorphic personalism (THP) which countenances immaterial noetic or 
intellectual powers in addition to the embodied psychological powers of 
animals. For HMA, all the psychological powers of an animal are embodied, 
and many are hylomorphically embodied in the nervous system. Just as the 
substance of the animal is constituted from the formal organization of its 
matter, so also the psychosomatic powers and operations of the animal are 
constituted from zones of organized material components, like the nervous 
system. Animals are fundamental entities for HMA, and it is the substance 
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of the animal that grounds its psychological, neurophysiological, and other 
biological, chemical, and physical attributes. The animal’s psychological 
attributes are constituted from the formal organization of its sub-psycho-
logical neurophysiological components, which are in turn constituted from 
the formal organization of various biochemical components, and so forth.1 
In the second section, I showed how the general ontological framework 
of HMA can be filled out by the NMP’s approach to neuroscience and 
psychology. NMP distinguishes four elements found in the hierarchical 
levels of mechanisms investigated by neuroscience: the organization of 
component entities and their component activities which function together 
to bring about the phenomenon of the mechanism taken as a whole. In the 
third section, I established that Aristotelian HMA is fundamentally incom-
patible with strong emergentism (SE), including versions of SE that purport 
to be Aristotelian. I then introduced a criticism leveled against SE by some 
proponents of NMP and showed why this criticism does not present any 
problems to HMA.2 In brief, unlike SE, HMA maintains that all psychological 
attributes of animals are embodied insofar as they are constituted from the 
organization of biological components of the animal.
This brings us to the more contentious claims of Thomist hylomorphic 
personalism, especially those concerning the interaction of immaterial 
intellectual powers with the other psychosomatic powers of the rational 
animal. How does THP fit within the less controversial picture provided 
by HMA and NMP? In this article, I present a speculative answer to these 
important questions beginning with the way Thomist hylomorphic personalism 
amplifies Thomist hylomorphic animalism.
1 In the first article, I introduced the well-known distinction between personal and sub-per-
sonal level attributes. In this article, I shall reserve this distinction for human persons and 
will employ a similar distinction between psychological and sub-psychological (or animal 
and sub-animal) level attributes in my treatment of topics common to humans and other 
animals.
2 Elsewhere I have argued that HMA can accommodate the insights of NMP and that HMA’s 
ontology of animal psychology can find in NMP the prospects of a complementary philos-
ophy of biology, neuroscience, psychology. I take such claims for granted in this essay. See 
De Haan 2017a.
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1. Thomist Hylomorphic Personalism
Because human persons are rational animals, Thomists approach both 
humans and other animals as unified wholes that can be understood by 
first describing their activities in the world, then analyzing these integrated 
activities into distinct objects and operations, which in turn illuminate the 
distinct powers possessed by humans and other animals, which help us to 
understand the substance and nature that distinguishes humans from other 
animals. In a word: from an experienced, understood, conceptualized, and 
verified multi-form unity, we begin the arduous task of differentiating the 
objects, operations, and powers grounded by a substance’s nature. This 
analysis is ultimately ordered towards a unified and integrated description 
and explanation of the whole (See ST I.77.1–8; In DA II, lt. 5–6). This phe-
nomenological cum philosophical analysis of the given polymorphic unity 
of conscious human experiences refracts into the myriad formal objects 
intentionalized by different psychological operations of apprehension: 
visibles by seeing, audibles by hearing, tangibles by touching, affordances 
by enactive perceptual registrations, imagables by imagining, intelligibles by 
intellectual abstraction, insight, conceptualization, and rational verification.
Thomas Aquinas, like most medieval Aristotelians, maintained that 
intellectual operations and the intentionalized intelligibles they apprehend 
completely transcend the conditions of materiality. Consequently, neither 
intellectual operations nor the intellectual powers that enable these noetic 
operations are embodied in biological organs like the nervous system. 
Aquinas writes,
Some powers of the soul, namely the intellect and will, are in the soul insofar 
as it exceeds the total capacity of the body; hence, powers of this sort are not 
said to be in any part of the body. Other powers, however, are common to the 
soul and the body, hence each of these powers … is only in that part of the body 
which is adapted (proportionata) to the operation of such a power. ST I.76.8ad43
3 See also QDSC, 2 ad5. All translations from the works of Thomas Aquinas are my own un-
less stated otherwise. Because my aims in this essay are not exegetical, but philosophical, 
my translations focus more on communicating the meaning of the text to a contemporary 
audience, rather than providing a literal translation of technical Scholastic nomenclature.
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Nevertheless, the intellectual powers and their operations, like all psycho-
logical powers, are grounded in the human soul which is the substantial 
form of the human body. The human soul, however, is an intellectual soul 
that can subsist without the body, because it is an immaterial subsistent 
principle. Aquinas explains:
The human soul’s mode of existence can be known from its operation. For 
insofar as the human soul has an operation that transcends materiality, its 
existence transcends the body and does not depend on the body. … Therefore, if 
the human soul insofar as it is united as form to the body also has an existence 
that transcends the body, and does not depend on the body, it is manifest that 
the soul itself is established on the boundary between corporeal and separate 
substances. QDdA 1 (Leon., 10: 337–341).
Because intellectual operations transcend the conditions of matter and 
cannot be reduced to any psychosomatic properties, the very being and 
subsistence of the human person and its animating substantial form cannot 
be reduced to any embodied or material principles. Aquinas contends that 
the immateriality of the intellectual soul does not undermine his view that 
the human person is a hylomorphically constituted animal, because, like 
the sensory soul of other animals, the intellectual soul can animate and 
organize the organic body as its substantial form.4 The intellectual soul:
4 “One must claim that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the 
form of the human body. For that by which something primarily operates (primo operatur) 
is the form of that to which the operation is attributed. For instance, that by which the 
body is primarily healed is health, and that by which the soul primarily knows is knowl-
edge (scientia); hence, health is a form belonging to the body, and knowledge is a form be-
longing to the soul. The reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is actually 
such-and-such, and so that by which it is actually such-and-such is that by which it acts. 
But it is obvious that the soul is that by which the body is primarily alive. And since life 
is made manifest by different operations within the different grades of living things, the 
soul is that by which we perform each of these vital acts. For instance, the soul is that by 
which we primarily assimilate nourishment (nutrimur), have sensory cognition (sentimus), 
and move from place to place (movemur secundum locum); and, similarly, the soul is that 
by which we primarily have intellective understanding (intelligimus). Therefore, this prin-
ciple by which we primarily have intellective understanding—regardless of whether it is 
called the intellect or the intellective soul—is the form of the body.” ST I.76.1 (Freddoso, 
mod. trans.). See ST I.75.2; QDdA 1.
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is separated with respect to its intellectual power, because the intellectual 
power is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ, as the power of 
vision is the act of the eye. For intellectual understanding is an act that cannot 
be performed by a corporeal organ, in the way that vision is exercised. But it 
is in matter insofar as the soul itself, to which the intellectual power belongs, 
is the form of the body and the terminus of human generation. ST I.76.1ad1.
Finally, as with other animals, the human person is neither the soul nor the 
body, nor any one or more of their psychological powers. Aquinas maintains 
that “the soul is not the whole human, and I am not my soul.” (In I Cor. 15, 
lt. 2 n. 924, Marietti, 411). The individual human person and their human 
nature is identified with the entire rational animal, the complete subsistent 
composite of rational soul and organic matter.5
Thomas Aquinas’s subtle doctrine and contentious arguments for the 
immateriality of the intellectual operations, powers, and soul have been 
treated extensively throughout the centuries and in the contemporary 
literature, so I will not rehearse them here.6 What I aim to explore is how 
the human person’s immaterial noetic operations—which transcend the 
conditions of matter—are able to interact with psychosomatic operations 
that are embodied as the formal organization of the material organs of the 
rational animal.
First, let us rehearse why Aquinas’s hylomorphic personalism, like his 
hylomorphic animalism, is not a form of strong emergentism. In the previous 
article, I noted that SE is a kind of dualism, and both emergent substance 
dualism and emergent property dualism maintain that the irreducible 
novel emergent mind, self, agent, or person, and any emergent mental 
properties, fundamentally depend upon and emerge from the complex 
organized physical substance and its properties. Mental entities depend on 
the physical entities that produce them. The challenge for SE as a philosophy 
of mind is to provide a convincing story about how physical causes produce 
5 See ST I.29.1ad5; 75.4. ST I.76.6.ad3; QDdA 1; QDSC 2, ad 2; Bazán 1997; Spencer 2014; 
De Haan and Dahm Forthcoming).
6 See Lonergan 1992, 538–44; Oderberg 2007; Feser 2013; Madden 2013, 265–274; Ross 
2008, 1992; Haldane 2016; Klima and Hall 2011; Braine 1992, 2014.
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mental properties, how the novel properties of the mind can (efficiently) 
cause other mental effects and physical effects, and why these mental 
causes neither overdetermine nor are in competition with physical causes 
of these physical effects. Neo-Aristotelian HMA and THP not only reject the 
mental–physical dichotomy and its associated Crypto-Cartesian ontology, 
but also provide a completely different framework for understanding how 
psychosomatic and noetic attributes, like powers and their operations, are 
grounded in a substance constituted by the organization of matter by an 
animating substantial form.
For THP, the human person is a rational animal because it belongs to the 
nature of its substance to ground both immaterial noetic powers as well as 
essentially psychosomatic powers and to enable their integrated operations, 
which includes the wide range of activities that comprise human agency. 
When a human person acts or is acted upon these activities enlist a pan-
oply of noetic and psychosomatic powers—and the organized hierarchical 
complex of neural, biochemical, and physical subsystems that constitute 
psychosomatic powers—whose coordinated and integrated operations 
enable the human person to perform the activities in question. For SE, 
however, mental or psychological properties exert some kind of mental force 
or efficient causality on independently existing and functioning physical 
properties, like the nervous system, bodily limbs, and so forth. Hence, for 
THP, the entire concert of noetic and psychosomatic activities involved in 
running to catch a bus constitute the observable psychological behavior of 
the human, whereas for SE, psychological attributes are restricted to the 
non-observable mind, whose mental causes—like intentions or desires—
efficiently cause extrinsic bits of matter in the brain which in turn produce 
the observable non-psychological bodily behavior of running after the bus 
(Zahavi 2011; Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
Second, Aquinas not only claims the operations of the human person’s 
psychosomatic powers for sensation, perception, phantasia, and emotion 
interact with intellectual and volitional operations, he also contends that this 
interaction is natural and continuous. Indeed, “it is impossible for our intel-
lect … to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.” 
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(ST I.84.7)7 The intelligibles intentionalized by the intellect are abstracted 
from phantasms, which are comprised of a constellation of perceptual 
recognition sortals, memories, a treasury of linguistic schemata, and a host 
of other phenomena we can consciously experience (e.g., imagery, emotions, 
pains).8 Intellectual understanding and conceptualization are the offspring 
of the intellectual desire to understand the world the human encounters 
as a rational animal. But intellectual understanding and conceptualization 
about the world can be knowledge only if understood conceptualizations have 
been rationally verified in a judgment that truly grasps such-and-such is 
the case.9 And this requires intellectual reflection on the phantasms as well 
as vigilant observations and continuous active exploration of the world. In 
short, our intellect’s natural and constant orientation is directed towards 
the reality we experience as rational animals. Aquinas writes, “in order for 
the intellect to be actually engaged in intellective understanding—not only 
for attaining knowledge de novo, but also for making use of already acquired 
knowledge—what is required are acts of the imagination and of the other 
powers.” (ST I.84.7. Freddoso mod. trans.). Human affectivity, motivations, 
emotions, intentions, deliberations, choices, and voluntary intentional 
actions are no different in this respect, but that is a more complex story to 
be told another day.10
7 See ST I–II.9.1; DV 24.5 (Lonergan 1992; Lonergan 1997; Ross 2008; Braine 1992, 2014).
8 See Ross 2008, 97. Wonder, the desire to know, and abstraction are preconditions for intel-
lectual operations of rational enquiry, understanding, formulation, rational reflection, and 
judgmental understanding—the operations Aquinas attributes to a noetic power called the 
potential intellect (intellectus possibilis). Wonder—along with any acquired virtues of a dis-
ciplined intelligent enquirer that enhance wonder—disposes one’s capacity for intellectual 
abstraction insofar as it aims one’s intellectual discrimination and attention towards what 
is relevant over what is irrelevant. Metaphysically speaking, abstraction is a distinct oper-
ation for intellectual intentionalization that Aquinas attributes to a noetic power called 
the active intellect (intellectus agens). For Aquinas, the abstractive operation of the active 
intellect produces actually immaterial intentionalized intelligible content that is derived 
from an intelligent engagement with the potentially intelligible content of phantasms. See 
Aquinas, In DA III.4–5, lt. 7–10; ST I.54.4; 79.1–5; 84–89; Lonergan 1997, ch. 4.
9 See ST I.16.2; 17.2–3; 84.7–8; Lonergan 1988; Lonergan 1992; Ross 2008.
10 See Bennett and Hacker 2003; Hacker 2008; Nachev and Hacker 2014; Brock 1998; Wojtyła 
1979; De Haan 2011; De Haan 2014.
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Additionally, it is worth noting that both linguistic apprehension and 
expression are part and parcel of the complex coordinated operations of 
the internal sensorium that Aquinas calls phantasia. Indeed, the intellect’s 
natural proclivity to be constantly oriented to the phantasms has been 
rightly interpreted by Bernard Lonergan, Etienne Gilson, James Ross, David 
Braine, Alasdair MacIntyre, and many others to reflect Aquinas’s deep 
appreciation of how crucial language is, not just for expressing human 
knowledge, but more fundamentally for facilitating intellectual enquiry, 
understanding, conceptualization, rational reflection, intelligent judgments, 
practical reasoning, and thinking within the medium of words.11 Intellectual 
understanding is constantly being deployed in tandem with the exercise of 
our linguistic capacities along with the concert of psychosomatic powers 
that comprise them.
In sum, a Thomist philosophical anthropology rejects emergent du-
alism and its Crypto-Cartesian framework for mental causation and is 
committed instead to Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism, even in the case 
of human persons. But Thomist hylomorphic personalism also maintains 
that the noetic powers and operations grounded in the soul of rational 
animals are completely disembodied. And yet, these noetic operations of 
intellect and will constantly interact with the neurophysiologically embodied 
psychological operations of sensing, perceptually registering, imagining, 
remembering, and having somatic affections, passions, and emotions. How 
are these irreducibly immaterial noetic operations capable of interacting 
with these essentially psychosomatic operations? 
2. Noetic and Psychosomatic Interactions  
in a Thomist Hylomorphic Personalism
I propose to address this question in two stages. The interaction among 
distinct psychosomatic operations provides an initial paradigm that I then 
extend to include the intellectual operations of the intellect. So, the for-
11 See Braine 1992; Braine 2014; Lonergan 1997; Gilson 1988; MacIntyre 1999; Ross 2008; 
De Haan 2010.
6(2)/201864
DA N I E L D E H A A N
mer paradigm helps us to work out how noetic operations interact with 
psychosomatic operations. In order to make clear what exactly intellectual 
operations contribute to psychosomatic operations like seeing, hearing, 
touching, perceptually registering, being motivated, having emotions, 
executing purposive behavior, imagining, and remembering, I draw on James 
Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations. Ross’s 
arguments are based on the impossibility of any wholly physical system 
realizing definite mathematical and logical forms or pure functions—like 
conjunction, addition, and modus ponens—that are naturally and ubiqui-
tously employed in human intellectual operations.
2.1. Psychosomatic Interactions  
in a Thomist Hylomorphic Animalism
Humans (and other animals) deploy a range of personal level (or animal 
level) psychosomatic abilities, call these psychological level attributes. These 
psychosomatic abilities can be distinguished into lower-level psychosomatic 
operations like seeing, hearing, and touching, and higher-level psychosomatic 
operations like enactive perceptual and estimative registration, memory, 
motivation, emotion, and a range of executive functions. These higher-level 
and lower-level psychosomatic operations are all animal level attributes, 
which admit of a surfeit of sub-animal level attributes, such as the complex 
hierarchy of multilevel mechanisms identified by NMP. Lower-level and 
higher-level psychosomatic operations interact with each other in a variety 
of complex ways. Sometimes the lower-level psychosomatic operations are 
actualized by environmental stimuli which thereby drive the coordinated 
manifestations of higher-level psychosomatic operations. In other cases, 
the animal’s powers for enactive perception, motivation, and executive 
registrations enable the animal to exert effective control over the coordinated 
manifestation of its higher-level and lower-level psychosomatic powers, such 
as the animal’s capacities for enactive sensory perception and motivation 
that guide locomotion.
What does this technical jargon mean? In the first case, a dog sees 
a colored moving object, perceptually registers it as a squirrel that affords 
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pursuit, which thereby motivates the dog to chase the squirrel. In the second 
instance, the dog is conveying a freshly slain rabbit to its pups when it 
notices a squirrel darting across its path, but because the dog is sufficiently 
determined towards its present course, the motivation to chase the squirrel 
is inhibited and the dog continues on its way.
Each of these psychosomatic operations enlists a distinct, though 
interactive, cascade of coordinated manifestations of powers constituted 
from organized hierarchies of neurophysiological and other biological levels 
of mechanisms. And just as neural assemblies in the visual cortex interact 
with neural assemblies in the medial temporal lobe, parietal lobe, frontal 
lobe, and so forth, so also the animal’s conscious seeing directly interacts 
with and shapes or is shaped by its conscious enactive perceptions and 
executive registrations to do something. For instance, an animal’s psycho-
somatic powers for executive registrations enable the animal to recognize 
and engage with salient affordances in its environment or to pursue objects 
that will satisfy some biopsychosocial imperative. Executive registrations 
also enable the animal to control its attention and inhibit distracting 
affordances—evoked by environmental or endogenous stimuli, e.g., fleeing 
squirrels or the pangs of hunger—that might motivate it to switch tasks 
while it is pursuing a determinate goal. Animal agency of this kind requires 
that the operations of an animal’s psychosomatic powers are able to inhibit 
other psychosomatic powers, while also coordinating and organizing the 
conscious operations of other powers, and ordering or directing them to the 
achievement of the biopsychosocial imperatives that presently occupy the 
animal’s attention. In order for a dog to return home to its pups, it must be 
able to harness and direct its enactive capacities for seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting, touching, perceiving, executive registering, and bodily movements 
to the task at hand, without being distracted by the kaleidoscope of other 
salient affordances it passes by along the way.12 This quotidian example 
12 Behavioral and cognitive psychology are replete with experiments on classical and oper-
ant conditioning and their connection to forms of stimulus versus cognitive or executive 
control, all of which demonstrate how executive functions like inhibitory control are cru-
cial for enabling the animal to override stimulus-driven responses. This data is impressive 
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provides a clear illustration of how distinct psychosomatic powers are able 
to interact with other psychosomatic powers by directing and controlling the 
coordinated manifestations of some psychosomatic powers while inhibiting 
the manifestation of others. The directed operations function as material 
potentialities or instruments to be actualized and formally ordered by the 
directing operations. Aquinas drew a similar conclusion in his treatment 
of the unity of human action.
Now just as, in the case of a genus of natural things, a whole is composed of 
matter and form, in the way that a man is composed of soul and body, and yet is 
one natural being even though it has many parts, so too, in the case of human 
acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power 
because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power’s actualizing it; for 
the act of the first agent is related as a form to the act of its instrument. Hence, it 
is clear that the act of commanding and the commanded act are one human act, 
just as a whole is one, but many in its parts. ST I–II.17.4 (Freddoso, mod. trans.).
While I do not have space to develop and defend the point here, this account 
of interactions among the psychosomatic powers of an animal requires 
that we distinguish between mechanistic organization and psychological 
organization. Mechanistic organization explains the way psychosomatic 
powers, their operations, and diverse forms of psychological organization 
among these powers and operations are constituted from and enabled by 
the organized sub-psychological level interactions among neural and other 
biological components. Psychological organization explains the psychological 
level interactions between the animal’s psychosomatic powers and objects 
in the animal’s environment; it concerns the way the manifestations or 
and important, however, my presentation of executive registrations and functions, as well 
as my understanding of the relevant data differs in important respects from the way this 
data is interpreted in the models of executive function discussed in cognitive psychology. 
My claim here is that in many cases, inhibitory control is not simply an activity attributed 
to various sub-animal or sub-psychological level information filters carried out by the 
“cognitive information processing” capacities of the nervous system. Rather, this kind of 
neural inhibition (or “cognitive” inhibition) must be distinguished from a genuinely psy-
chosomatic form of inhibition, which is a form of psychological organization proper to the 
psychological level attributes of the animal.
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operations of psychosomatic powers are actualized, coordinated, and directed 
by their reciprocal disposition partners, that is, by other psychosomatic 
powers and/or the powers of objects in the environment (Jaworski 2016, 
2017; Marmodoro 2017). Psychological organization pertains to the animal’s 
conscious intentionality that comprises its psychological behavior, such 
as its conscious attention to and pursuit of a biopsychosocial imperative 
that inhibits the manifestation of some psychosomatic powers (which, via 
mechanistic organization, inhibits the neurophysiological mechanisms 
that underlie and constitute these psychosomatic powers). Psychological 
organization is distinct from the mechanistic organization characterized by 
NMP because the powers and operations of vision and audition are not to be 
understood as the organized mechanistic components of the psychosomatic 
powers and operations of estimative registration, memory, emotion, or 
executive function (or vice-versa). Additionally, psychological organization 
pertains to the distinctively psychological level of the interaction among 
psychosomatic powers and so the kind of coordinating and directing organ-
ization that comprises the conscious intentionality of an animal. In short, 
psychological organization is the form of organization proper to conscious 
intentionality, which is absent from the kind of (causal) activities that 
comprise the mechanistically organized components of sub-psychological 
attributes of the animal. 
Finally, this form of psychological organization is a characteristically 
hylomorphic form of organization; to understand it along the lines of strong 
emergentism would be a mistake. This is because the phenomenon of an 
animal with conscious intentionality is not a SE mental property extrinsic 
from the physical base that generates it; it is a psychological level attribute 
of an animal that is the phenomenon constituted from the mechanistic 
organization of sub-psychological neural and other biological components 
of the animal’s psychosomatic powers. As with all of the other phenomena 
characterized by the NMP, the phenomenon of conscious intentionality is 
what the mechanistic organization of components taken as a whole con-
stitute. And, just as no amino acid can do what a protein constituted from 
the organization of amino acids can do, and no individual component of 
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a neuron can generate what constitutes the action potential of a neuron, so 
also none of the sub-psychological activities of the organized components 
of the psychosomatic powers of the animal exhibit conscious intentionality. 
Consider corvids. A corvid that experiences other birds stealing the food it 
caches in their presence, learns to re-cache its food once the other birds are 
absent (Shaw and Clayton 2012; Legg and Clayton 2014). The psychological 
phenomena of vision, estimative registration, memory, learning, and exec-
utive control that comprise the flexible psychological behavior of corvids 
are explained by the psychosomatic powers of the bird, not merely by its 
sub-psychological components. So, even though the different psychosomatic 
powers and operations that comprise the conscious intentionality of an 
animal are all constituted from organized sub-psychological components, the 
distinctive way in which these conscious psychosomatic powers interact qua 
psychological level attributes comprises a form of psychological organization 
that is not only absent from all of the mechanistic interactions among the 
sub-psychological components of these distinct psychosomatic powers, but 
also fails to meet the NMP’s criteria for mechanistic organization.
Clearly, this is but a pencil sketch that requires more detailed argu-
mentation to justify this account of interactions among psychosomatic 
powers and to distinguish different forms of biopsychosocial conditioning, 
learning, and cognitive flexibility exhibited in animal behavior. But I hope 
what I have said will be sufficient to help elucidate the more controversial 
contention of Thomist hylomorphic personalism, namely, that a similar 
kind of interaction can obtain between these embodied psychosomatic 
operations and disembodied immaterial noetic operations.
2.2. Definite Pure Functions Realized by Noetic Operations
For HMA, conscious psychosomatic operations, and the powers that ground 
them, are irreducible animal level attributes that are nevertheless essentially 
hylomorphically constituted from the organization of multilevel nervous 
and other biological systems, that is, sub-animal level attributes. These 
psychosomatic operations can interact directly with other psychosomatic 
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operations by inhibiting their actualization or by actualizing, coordinating, 
and directing their operations. HMA, combined with NMP, provides an 
alternative paradigm to standard Crypto-Cartesian accounts of mental 
causation and the interaction of distinct forms of conscious psychological 
operations. This alternative Neo-Aristotelian paradigm supports argu-
ments that contend it is unnecessary, problematic, and even conceptually 
confused to hold that the only way for mental causation to work, requires 
that psychological or mental operations be extrinsic efficient causes that 
directly cause physical effects in the brain.
What does Thomist hylomorphic personalism add to hylomorphic 
animalism? THP extends HMA’s paradigm for the interaction between 
psychosomatic operations to include the way noetic operations can interact 
with psychosomatic operations. THP also rejects standard accounts of action 
and mental causation wherein the mind directly acts on the brain as an 
extrinsic mental force or rationalizing efficient cause (For similar critiques, 
see Hyman 2015; Vogler 2016; Teichmann 2015; Stoutland 2011). For THP, 
intellectual operations directly engage with psychosomatic operations, in 
part, by coordinating the manifestation of these powers. And the coordinated 
manifestation of these psychosomatic powers enlists the organized causal 
powers of the sub-psychological neurophysiological mechanisms that con-
stitute these psychosomatic operations and powers. And like the paradigm 
case of psychosomatic operations, it is not mere efficient causality but 
formal and final causality that are critical for understanding the interaction 
between noetic operations and psychosomatic operations. What makes 
noetic operations and powers significantly different from psychosomatic 
ones, is that they are not embodied or constituted by the organization of 
any biofunctional parts of the rational animal, like the brain. So, unlike 
psychosomatic powers and operations, these noetic powers and operations 
transcend the conditions of matter and are thereby wholly grounded in 
the intellectual soul of the human person. What problems are generated 
by this account of disembodied noetic powers and operations interacting 
with embodied psychosomatic powers and operations?
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This is an important question, however, a better place to start, I think, 
is with the arguments made on behalf of this peculiarly Neo-Aristotelian 
doctrine that intellectual operations alone transcend the bodily organs that 
materially constitute the other psychological powers of human persons. Recall 
that Thomist philosophical anthropology commences with the polymorphic 
unity of the human person’s conscious engagement with the world. The 
psychological activities of human persons integrate conscious operations 
such as sensation, perception, intellectual insight, conceptualization, rational 
judgments, emotion, and intentional action; this integration unifies different 
intentional objects into the polymorphic or multiform intentional objects 
of conscious awareness. Phenomenological and philosophical analysis 
reflectively isolate among our conscious experiences of objects the invariant 
patterns of conscious activity that are united under the headings “intellectual 
operations” or “noetic operations.” In short, we already know that intellectual 
operations can be integrated with sensory and perceptual operations because 
we begin with the polymorphic unity of conscious operations and only later 
reflectively distinguish within this unified manifold “perceptual operations” 
from “intellectual operations.” This basic unity of conscious operations 
and intentional objects is one of many psychological facts that provide 
the point of departure for Thomist philosophical anthropology (Lonergan 
1988; MacIntyre 2006). The difficulty is working out a coherent and cogent 
explanation of the ontological features of these intellectual operations and 
how they interact with psychosomatic operations.
Many Neo-Aristotelians, like Aquinas, argue that intellectual operations 
exhibit certain essential features that reveal they must be intrinsically 
separate from the ontological conditions of matter, and so are immaterial. 
There are two noteworthy principles at work in these arguments which 
are developed out of the hylomorphic framework of a Neo-Aristotelian 
ontology. First, there is something about the conditions of materiality that 
excludes or prevents certain properties from being embodied. Second, the 
features essential to noetic operations are among the properties excluded 
by materiality, which is why they completely transcend the conditions of 
matter, conditions that belong to every hylomorphic composite. Both tra-
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ditional and contemporary Neo-Aristotelian accounts of the immateriality 
of intellectual operations provide arguments that support both of these 
principles. My interest here is with the second principle.
In general, Neo-Aristotelian defenses of the second principle focus 
on why the form or content of these intellectual operations establish the 
intellect’s transcendence or immateriality. Aquinas championed arguments 
that addressed both the universal content of noetic operations and the 
universal forms of operations manifested by the intellect, like its completely 
self-reflexive acts of understanding. More recently, James Ross has con-
tributed a number of insightful arguments to the stock of Neo-Aristotelian 
defenses of the immateriality of intellectual operations. Ross’s arguments 
focus more on the forms of intellectual thought than their content. I do 
not have space here to rehearse the details of Ross’s ingenious argument 
or to defend it. A brief summary will be sufficient to show how the central 
insight of Ross’s argument also sheds light on what intellectual operations 
alone can contribute to conscious experience by ordering and teleologically 
directing the form and content presented by psychosomatic operations (See 
Ross 1992; Ross 2008, ch. 6; Feser 2013).
First, Ross acknowledges that the range of animal abilities for cognition 
and appetition can be explained in some fashion by physical explanations; 
a claim that is compatible with my account of HMA and NMP. Second, human 
understanding, that is, “judgmental understanding capable of truth or falsi-
ty,” (Ross 2008, 197, n. 5) is different in principle from these psychosomatic 
operations; it cannot be wholly explained by any kind of physical explanation, 
including the ontologically generous kinds of explanation provided by HMA.13 
Third, Ross, like Aquinas, maintains that human understanding in this life 
always involves “a physical medium in-which.” (Ross 2008, 116). He notes, 
“it is only the understanding element that I am now trying to show cannot 
13 In their insightful account of radical enactivist cognition, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin 
introduce a similar distinction between the basic intentionality of nonhuman animals 
and the truth-content involving intentionality of rational animals. Aristotelians will find 
a lot to appreciate in the work of Hutto and Myin and it is worth considering what bearing 
Ross’s arguments would have on their naturalistic account of radical enactivist cognition 
and what they call the “hard problem of content.” See Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017.
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be wholly physical; understandings that involve sensation or feeling cannot 
be entirely nonphysical either, anymore than my going for a walk can be 
a mere willing.” (Ross 2008, 197, n. 5). It is truth-carrying understanding or 
thinking that Ross contends requires intrinsic features that “no physical 
thing or process can have at all.” (Ross 2008, 116). What are these ontological 
immaterial remainders essential to truth-carrying understanding that cannot 
in principle be explained by wholly physical processes?
Developed and integral [human persons] have the native ability and constant 
proclivity … to discern, recognize, and rely on intelligible, repeatable, structures 
of things, many of which are active and explanatory…. Such ability cannot be 
reductively physical... [because of such facts as] the underdetermination of the 
physical relatively to pure functions, [which] disclose that no entirely physical 
thing can do operations that realize pure functions determinately, yet, any integral 
human does that constantly. (Ross 2008, 115).
Ross’s central claim is that human judgmental understanding realizes 
definite pure functions all of the time, and that no wholly physical process 
can realize definite pure functions. The prevalence of intellectual operations 
performing such definite pure functions should not be underestimated. Ross 
has in mind all intelligent realizations of any definite pure function from log-
ic or mathematics, or, for instance, any of the pure functions that are touched 
upon in the late E.J. Lowe’s Forms of Thought, such as reference, predication, 
identity, modality, conditionality, generality, negation, existence, and truth. 
These pure functions or forms of thought also include Bernard Lonergan’s 
treatment of the normative exigencies of intelligence and rationality, as 
well as the late David Braine’s account of the “general logic” that underlies 
and is incorporated into grammar (Lowe 2013; Lonergan 1992; Braine 2014, 
36–47, 748–749). When I intellectually reason by employing a definite pure 
function, like modus ponens (“If p then q; p; therefore q”), my intellectual 
operation realizes a definite form of valid reasoning. It cannot merely 
approximate the ideal form of modus ponens; my rational understanding 
must be a definite instance of that pure function that thereby excludes all 
incompossible pure functions (Ross 2008, 117–23). The reason why human 
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judgmental understanding cannot be a mere simulation of or fail to be of 
a definite pure form is because if it did fail, then judgmental understanding 
would “fail to have the defining features of conjunction, disjunction, modus 
ponens, addition, and so on, upon which validity, consistency, and the like 
depend.” (Ross 2008, 117). 
In a word: our thinking, in a single case, can be of a definite abstract form (e.g., 
N x N = N2), and not indeterminate among incompossible equally most particular 
forms. … No physical process can be that definite in its form in a single case. Adding 
physical instances even to infinity will not exclude incompossible equally most 
particular forms (cf. Saul Kripke’s “plus/quus” examples). So, no physical process 
can exclude incompossible functions from being equally well (or badly satisfied…) 
Thus, no physical process can be the whole of such thinking. (Ross 2008, 116).
Ross anticipates the skeptical reactions of his analytic philosophy col-
leagues. He points out that many analytic philosophers not only attribute 
more bizarre features to propositions, but also, and more to the point, 
that his argument does not rest upon the peculiarity of certain ancient or 
medieval philosophical views, but on the “jewels of analytic philosophy: 
the underdetermination of hypotheses by data and the indeterminacy of 
the physical.” (Ross 2008, 116).14 And these widely held insights developed 
by 20th century analytic philosophers entail that the limitations of physical 
objects or systems under the conditions of matter exclude the possibility 
for any wholly physical system to realize definite pure functions that de-
terminately exclude all incompossible pure functions.15 But the realization 
14 “No matter what a machine does or for how long, what it is doing remains formally indeter-
minate. That’s supported by W.V.O. Quine’s underdetermination claims, Nelson Goodman’s 
“grue” reflections (1955, 63–86), and the “plus-quus” considerations of Kripke (1982, 9 and 
passim).” Ross 2008, 119. For Ross’s references, see Goodman 1983; Kripke 1982.
15 Ross also anticipates the evasion that humans, like physical machines, merely simulate 
pure functions like contradiction and modus ponens; we might be able to define them, 
but we do not realize them. The problem with this dodge is that, “there is a pragmatic 
contradiction in denying that we can think in pure functions. To define such a function is 
to think in a form that is not indeterminate among incompossible forms. And to deny ex-
plicitly that we can do a specified operation, whether add, conjoin, […] or define particular 
functions, like conjunction, is to do what is being denied. Such an epidemic of theoretical 
doubt as to what we can do, without any effect on one’s own practical certainty, must 
involve a mistake.” (Ross 2008, 121–22).
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of definite pure functions that do exclude all incompossible pure functions 
is characteristic of ordinary exercises of human intellectual understanding.
The details of Ross’s argument and the defense of its premises is beyond 
the limits of this essay. I shall presume that Ross’s argument is cogent. 
What does Ross’s account of the immateriality of intellectual operations 
that realize definite pure functions tell us about the interaction of noetic 
operations with psychosomatic operations?
Even though they transcend the conditions of matter, the intellectual 
operations that really employ these definite pure functions are performed by 
human persons, and as Ross points out, they are regularly exercised in such 
a way that these intellectual operations organize and direct psychosomatic 
operations such that they are governed by these pure functions. Intellec-
tual operations are constantly shaping or ordering our enactive capacities 
for perceptual registrations as well as any phenomenal presentations of 
phantasia. For example, human linguistic apprehension and expression 
involve psychosomatic operations, but these psychosomatic operations as 
such are not able to realize definite pure functions. However, when human 
persons ratiocinate intelligently they do deploy and realize definite pure 
functions in their intellectual thinking, and characteristically do so while 
thinking “in the medium of words,” that is, by apprehending or expressing 
intelligent speech. And intelligent speech comprises the psychosomatic 
operations involved in linguistic production or expression that are governed, 
organized, and directed by intellectual operations that do realize definite 
pure functions like conjunction, modus ponens, modus tollens, and so forth. 
A complementary point is made by David Braine in his comprehensive study, 
Language and Human Understanding.
The brain is vital to us as bodily beings if our understanding is to find expression 
in speech and in coordination with perception, imagination, memory, emotion, 
and action. But the role of the brain is rather to facilitate our expression of 
understanding and thinking in the medium of words than to embody it. Our 
thinking is not embodied in language, but expressed using it; nor is it embodied 
in neural or imaginative sequences. The activities of understanding, thinking, 
and questioning, with their nonrepresentational character, combined with our 
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freedom in the exercise of the capacity involved exhibited in the lack of definable 
limits to the flexibility in our use of words, show that these activities cannot be 
the work of any bodily organ. This does not make them the work of some other 
organ, but the activities of the person as such. (Braine 2014, 67).
What Ross’s arguments bring to our attention is that, not only do human 
intellectual operations intentionalize a distinct kind of universal and 
transcendent content, but that they also understand that content according 
to definite forms of thought or pure functions via noetic operations that 
interact with psychosomatic operations by governing, ordering, and directing 
them in such a way that they derivatively exhibit the definite pure functions 
of our intellectual operations. In other words, noetic operations interact 
with psychosomatic operations via formal and final causality by rationally 
ordering and directing the manifestation of psychosomatic powers. If this 
were not true, then, according to Ross, I would not be able to intelligently 
think and express, via psychosomatic operations, sentences that are gov-
erned by definite pure functions, and you, the reader, would be incapable of 
intelligently apprehending them as manifesting the definite pure functions 
I intend them to exhibit. But I am intentionally articulating an argument that 
you, the reader, can understand as definitely exhibiting modus tollens and 
not modus ponens or any other incompossible pure functions. Hence, the 
antecedent is false. Human persons do perform integrated intellectual and 
psychosomatic operations whereby their immaterial intellectual operations 
interact with materially conditioned psychosomatic operations in at least one 
way, namely, by directing and organizing linguistic expressions according 
to the definite pure functions realized in intellectual operations.16
What does this account of noetic and psychosomatic operations from 
THP have to say in response to the challenge from NMP detailed in my 
previous article? Contrary to some proponents of SE, THP does not claim 
that there is direct empirical support from neuroscience for the existence 
16 A similar account can be provided for the way practical reasoning and intentional actions 
are embodied in our psychological behaviors that are not also speech acts, see MacIntyre 
2007, pp. 161–162 and chs. 14–15; MacIntyre 2006, ch. 5.
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of noetic operations or any downward mental causation that acts on the 
brain. Indeed, following Aquinas and Ross, the contention of THP is quite 
the opposite. First, the essential features of these intellectual operations 
that reveal their immateriality and transcendence from material condi-
tions cannot be directly disclosed by the experimental investigations of 
neuroscience; rather, neuroscientists deploy these definite functions in the 
reasoning that orders their experimental investigations. Second, contrary to 
SE’s account of downward mental causation, THP maintains that intellectual 
operations interact directly with psychosomatic operations, not with the 
nervous system. The noetic powers of the intellect and will engage the 
psychosomatic powers, not the sub-psychological powers of the nervous 
system that materially constitute these psychosomatic powers. Furthermore, 
the interactions between noetic and psychosomatic powers are principally 
via formal and final causality, not via any kind of extrinsic mental force 
directly causing effects in the brain. The intellect does not act on the brain 
and the brain does not act on the intellect; for THP there is no interfield 
mental–physical causation between the intellect and brain. Additionally, 
unlike the way psychosomatic powers and operations are constituted from 
something like the new mechanists’ account of organized component entities 
and activities—like neural and other biological systems—psychosomatic 
powers and operations are not components that constitute noetic powers 
and operations. The organized manifestation of psychosomatic powers 
via the operations of our noetic powers is a form of rational or intellectual 
organization that is distinct both from the mechanistic organization that 
explains the way psychosomatic powers are constituted from sub-psycho-
logical neural systems, and from the non-rational psychological organization 
proper to the aforementioned interaction among psychosomatic powers.17 
It therefore belongs to the very nature of these intellectual operations that 
17 For an account of the way psychosomatic operations of humans and other animals that 
involve psychological organization are different from the noetic operations proper to hu-
man persons that involve rational organization, see Hutto 2008. Hutto’s terminology, how-
ever, is quite different from my own, and his concerns are with psychological issues, not 
the more metaphysical ones I am addressing here. Indeed, Hutto’s version of naturalism 
would reject THP’s account of immaterial noetic powers.
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they do not admit of the kind of mechanistic explanations that NMP and 
HMA provide for psychosomatic powers and operations. Consequently, 
NMP’s challenge to SE, gets no purchase on THP, because THP maintains 
that noetic operations are strictly immaterial, do not emerge from the brain, 
do not have any kind of direct multilevel mechanistic explanation, and so 
cannot be directly supported, confirmed, or refuted by scientific evidence.
This conclusion, however, does not entail these explanations from NMP 
and HMA have no bearing upon the intellectual operations of THP. Just as 
Aquinas recognized that lesions in the brain could cause impairments to 
phantasia that adversely affected the human person’s ability for intellectual 
understanding, so too our THP amplifications to NMP and HMA, can draw 
upon the latest in work in neuropsychology to make more precise expla-
nations—or at least complementary explanations at a variety of different 
levels—for various psychological deficits.18 For instance, impediments 
to the causal processes of certain mechanistic components critical for 
higher-level psychosomatic operations, say, dorsolateral frontal lesions 
that adversely affect executive registrations, will thereby indirectly hinder 
the human person’s ability to perform any intellectual operations that 
interact with, and so require the integrity of, such psychosomatic opera-
tions as executive registrations. Any unified activity of the human person 
requires the integrated operations of diverse reciprocal powers. Intellectual 
operations of practical reasoning and intentional action can only formally 
govern and direct executive registrations, memorative recollections, and 
the apprehension or articulation of intelligent speech if they are integrated 
with these psychosomatic operations. But there can be no such interaction 
between intellectual and psychosomatic operations if there are impediments 
to the exercise of these psychosomatic capacities. Impediments can arise 
at the psychological level of these psychosomatic capacities for perceptual 
registration, memory, and speech as well as at the sub-psychological level of 
the neural, genetic, and biochemical systems and subsystems that constitute 
and enable the proper functioning of these psychosomatic capacities.
18 See ST I.78.4; 84.7 89.5. See Craver 2007; Kendler, Zachar, and Craver 2011; Hughes 2011.
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Consider the following very conjectural sketch for how the psychological 
and sub-psychological effects of Alzheimer’s disease fit within THP. Neural 
cell death is hypothesized to result from beta-amyloid plaques and neu-
rofibrillary tangles of the tau protein; the progression of these pathologies 
of the organized components of neurons leads to the degeneration of the 
neural systems constituted from the complex organization of networks of 
neurons. (Of course, this is extraordinarily simplified as I am leaving out 
a host of genetic and other intracellular and extracellular mechanisms and 
the entire scaffolding of multilevel mechanisms that bring us from neurons 
to neural systems.) The atrophy of the medial temporal lobe constituted 
from such deteriorating neural systems impedes the optimal functioning of 
the personal or psychological level psychosomatic powers and operations 
that are themselves constituted from and enabled by the organization of 
neural networks distributed throughout areas of the brain like the medial 
temporal lobe. Psychosomatic powers like memory—which are constituted 
from the organization of these atrophied sub-psychological neural systems—
will be seriously hindered insofar as the manifestation of psychosomatic 
operations of recall and reminiscence depend upon enlisting the organized 
causal components of these sub-psychological neural systems. When the 
rational animal’s psychosomatic capacities for recollection and reminiscence 
are inhibited by the atrophy of its sub-psychological neural systems, then 
not only will psychosomatic acts of recall be obstructed, so also will all 
forms of reminiscence that are otherwise governed and directed through 
interactions with intellectual operations. Intelligent narration that relies 
upon psychosomatic capacities for reminiscence will be thwarted whenever 
reminiscence is impeded. So, if reminiscence cannot be exercised—because 
it cannot enlist the capacities of the crucial neural systems that constitute 
memory due to neurodegeneration in the medial temporal lobe—then acts 
of reminiscence cannot be enlisted and guided by noetic operations, and 
intelligent narration becomes disabled.
In short, even though the deleterious effects of neurodegenerative 
disorders directly impact the psychosomatic powers and operations consti-
tuted from these deteriorating neural systems, they only indirectly impede 
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intellectual powers and operations by inhibiting their capacity to formally 
govern, order, and direct psychosomatic operations. Any human activities 
that require the integrated confluence of noetic and psychosomatic oper-
ations—which for THP includes all intelligent activities of theoretical and 
practical reasoning and intentional action in this life—will be obstructed 
by damage to the sub-psychological neural systems that constitute and 
enable the psychosomatic powers of the rational animal.
Conclusion
This essay has, via two articles, brought together a variety of moving parts 
to amplify and clarify how a Thomist philosophical anthropology can engage 
and draw upon the riches of contemporary neuroscience, the new mechanist 
philosophy, hylomorphic animalism, and still maintain Aquinas’s doctrine 
that the human intellect transcends bodily organs and yet exercises oper-
ations that are constantly interacting with the human person’s essentially 
psychosomatic operations. In the course of these two articles, I have also 
endeavored to make clear how radically different the standard account of 
strong emergentism in philosophy of mind is from Neo-Aristotelian hylo-
morphic animalism and Thomist hylomorphic personalism. The emergentists 
approach ontological questions and even empirical work in neuroscience 
from the vantage point of a Crypto-Cartesian view of the mind; whereas 
hylomorphists approach ontological questions and neuroscientific and 
psychological research from an Aristotelian framework that begins with 
rational and other animals. Rational and other animals are fundamental 
entities that ground their noetic, psychosomatic, neurophysiological, and 
other biological, chemical, and physical attributes. The activities animals 
perform enlist the coordinated manifestations of their psychological and 
sub-psychological powers; impediments to lower-level powers inhibit the 
proper functioning of the higher-level powers constituted from the formal 
organization of these lower-level powers. Drawing upon the work of the new 
mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology as well as James Ross’s 
arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations, I have shown 
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that a Thomist philosophical anthropology can defend Aquinas’s thesis 
that immaterial noetic operations constantly interact with psychosomatic 
operations—like whenever I communicate intelligent speech to you, the 
reader. If this study on Thomist philosophical anthropology is on the right 
track, then my intelligent speech is comprised of the immaterial noetic 
operations that realize definite pure functions that govern, shape, and direct 
the concert of psychosomatic operations that also comprise my speech 
acts. In short, intelligently thinking in the medium of words or expressing 
my thoughts to you, requires that I, a human person, can deploy together 
in a unified way my transcendent and immanent powers to produce a very 
concrete act of communication—like the communication of my thesis in 
this essay. How it is seen, heard, perceived, interpreted, doubted, refuted, 
rationally verified, amplified, or revised, is for you to determine.19
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